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Summary 
We introduce endogenous investments for increasing conventional and non-conventional oil 
extraction capacity in the integrated assessment model WITCH. The international price of oil 
emerges as the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. When carbon emissions are 
not constrained, oil is used throughout the century, with unconventional oil taking over 
conventional oil from mid-century onward. When carbon emissions are constrained, oil 
consumption drops dramatically and the oil price is lower than in the BaU. Unconventional 
oil is not extracted. Regional imbalances in the distribution of stabilisation costs are 
magnified and the oil-exporting countries bear, on average, costs three times larger than in 
previous estimates. 
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non-conventional oil extraction capacity in the integrated assessment 
model WITCH. The international price of oil emerges as the Nash 
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Introduction 
Ambitious climate policies that aim at stabilising  Greenhouse Gases concentrations in the 
atmosphere at low levels ask for a dramatic contraction of fossil fuels use during the  entire 
century. The shift from fossil fuel-based to zero-carbon energy systems will be gradual, but after 
two and a half centuries of supremacy, coal, oil and natural gas will only be used marginally. It 
is not necessary to employ sophisticated Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to depict this 
scenario.
1 A simple back-of-the-envelope exercise would show only a minimal amount of 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions that will be tolerated in the long-run equilibrium to keep 
concentrations stable at safe levels. In a future world in which GHG emissions must virtually 
disappear, it will be more valuable to keep carbon underground than releasing it into the 
atmosphere. 
While it might still be convenient to use coal and natural gas in power plants equipped with 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) devices, the impossibility to capture diffused emissions 
from transport dooms oil to a fast decline.
2 Volumes of crude oil traded in the international 
market will become almost irrelevant and financially modest, and oil rich countries have to 
restructure their economies deeply to avoid major economic and welfare losses. The emergence 
of a low-carbon world will mark the end of an “oil age”, with still widely unexplored economic, 
technological and geopolitical implications. 
It is straightforward to predict that oil demand will shrink dramatically in a scenario in which 
climate policy is severe and is implemented successfully worldwide.  It is instead harder to 
imagine an optimal transition to this long-run equilibrium and to assess the economic 
consequences and the distributional impacts of the oil market collapse. These issues are 
addressed in this paper. 
The main questions are the following: how will investment decisions in oil extraction capacity 
be affected when a cap on emissions is imposed throughout the century? How will these 
decisions shape oil supply and how will they affect international trade of oil and oil price? 
Economies that are heavily dependent on oil export will likely lose from a terms of trade effect 
and from the contraction of demand. To what degree will they be able to restructure their 
production activities to answer the threat that a low-carbon world poses to their economies? 
And what will eventually be the long-term macroeconomic impact of the mitigation policy, at 
the global and regional level when we describe the oil sector with greater accuracy ? 
                                                 
1 For recent work on climate policy and energy scenarios with IAMs see Clarke et al (2009). 
2 While it is technically possible to use oil in power plants with CCS, this option is not economically 
convenient.   3
In order to provide an answer to these questions we introduce endogenous investments in oil 
extraction capacity and international trade of oil in the hybrid integrated assessment model 
WITCH (Bosetti et al,  2006; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007; Bosetti et al, 2009). We 
design long-term world and regional scenarios of optimal demand and supply of oil when GHG 
emissions are capped in order to reach a concentration level of 550ppm CO2-eq at the end of the 
century. We compare them to oil sector dynamics when carbon emissions are  not constrained. 
The mutual interactions of the oil sector with the demand of other fossil fuels, with investments 
in the power sector,  the incentives to develop a carbon-free substitute for oil in transport and  
an international carbon market are all taken into account. 
For the twelve macro-regions of WITCH, we model an oil sector that evolves endogenously. 
Production of oil is a function of extraction capacity built by means of endogenously 
determined investments. The Oil sector is modelled considering eight categories of oil, 
reflecting minimal extraction costs and emissions related to oil extraction for each category. The 
cost of additional oil extraction stocks is also endogenous and depends both on a short-term 
component, which mimics cost spikes when expansion capacity grows too fast, and on a long-
term component, which reflects oil scarcity. Thus, the total expenditure in the oil sector is also 
endogenous. Once extracted, oil can be used for domestic consumption and can be traded 
internationally. The price of oil emerges endogenously as an outcome of a Nash game among 
the twelve regions. 
In Table 1 and in Table 2 we summarise the main characteristics of a sub-set of all IAMs that 
have endogenous trade of oil: MERGE (Manne and Richels 2004), REMIND-R (Leimbach et al 
2008), IMACLIM (Hourcade et al 2006), IMAGE (Bouwman, Kram and Goldewijk 2006), 
MiniCAM (Brenkert et al 2003), MESSAGE (Nakicenovic and Riahi 2003), EPPA (Paltsev et 
al 2005; Babiker et al 2008).
3 
 
                                                 
3 MERGE also models trade of natural gas. IMAGE and TIAM model trade of oil, gas and coal; TIAM  
models trade of uranium. TIAM, however, is a bottom-up engineering-type model that does not describe 
the macro-economy or  the impact of emissions on global climate.   4
Models Cost Function Trade Transportation Costs Technological Progress
WITCH
Endogenous. Floor cost based on oil 
categories. 
Global trade Markups reflect constraints and other costs. No
IMAGE
Step function with multiple grades. 12 
categories for oil, gas and nuclear fuels, 14 for 
coal.
Bilateral trade
Interregional distances. Mark-up to reflect 
constraints and other costs (taxes, etc.).
Yes
Endogenous
MINICAM Supply curve. Short term capacity constraint. Global trade Regional mark-up. Yes
EPPA
Step function with multiple grades. Convex 
aggregation of different fuel resources allows 
multiple resource grades to be produced at the 
same time.
Bilateral trade
Interregional distances. Mark-up to reflect 
constraints and other costs (taxes, etc.).
Yes
MESSAGE Step functions with multiple grades. Global trade Markups that mimic transportation costs.
Yes
Endogenous
IMACLIM Step function exogenous. Global trade Yes No
MERGE Step function - 10 Cost Categories. Global trade Yes No
REMIND
Specifc fuel costs are a function of previous 
cumulative extraction (extraction cost curve - 
see Rogner, 1997).
Global trade
REMIND-R: import  and export  of tradable 
primary energy types is added, taking 
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Price Index at 
2050
Base Year 2000 
(BaU)
CTL Resources
Price Index at 
2050
Base Year 2000 
(BaU)
WITCH No 20 93 2.2 
b No 15 ZJ No 2.2 
b No 433 ZJ 1.25 
b
IMAGE Yes 45 ZJ
 c Yes 1.7 No 117 ZJ
 c Yes 1.9 No 300 ZJ 1.3
MINICAM Yes 18 ZJ Yes 1.6 Yes  19,5 ZJ 16 ZJ 1.2 Yes > 250 ZJ 1.1 
d
EPPA Yes 35 ZJ 
a 637 ZJ 3.0 




2.1 - 5.5 
f No 179 ZJ 1.1 - 2.0 
f
MESSAGE Yes 12 ZJ  98 2.0 No 16.5 ZJ 836 ZJ 1.6 Yes 258 ZJ n.a.
IMACLIM Yes 9 ZJ 
h 7 ZJ 
h 3.5 
g Yes n.a. Yes 2.0 Yes n.a. 1.5
MERGE Yes 6 ZJ Yes 1.5 No 5 ZJ No 2.2 Yes 300 ZJ  1.1 
b
REMIND Yes  < 10 ZJ 
h Yes 2.1 
b No 6 ZJ Yes 1.2 
b Yes < 30 ZJ 2.0 
b
a Including tar sands
f depending on the region    
b Base Year 2005      g Base Year 2001  
c includes non-conventional resources
h Oil reserves
d at 2100
e Base year 1997          
COAL NATURAL GAS OIL
 
Table 2. Fossil fuels data: an overview of assumption in Integrates Assessment Models.   5
In IMACLIM, coal and gas extraction costs are described using reduced forms of cost functions 
from the energy model POLES (Criqui 2001). Oil price is equal to the production cost plus a  
mark-up. The available capacity of oil production is assumed to follow a ‘Hubbert’ curve 
(1962). In IMAGE, the production cost increases endogenously as a consequence of fossil fuels 
exhaustion. A more detailed description of the oil sector is given in MESSAGE IV, which 
displays eight categories of conventional and non-conventional oil. In MINICAM, REMIND 
and EPPA model the oil resources data are taken from Rogner (1997). However, in EPPA the 
authors make shale oil available only in four regions where the resources are more promising: 
USA, Former Soviet Union, Africa, and in Australia. In MERGE, oil resources are divided into 
ten categories; costs increase as oil extraction moves from conventional to unconventional 
categories. 
We calibrate the model in order to reproduce observed oil production and international inter-
regional net trade flows of oil in 2005, the base year of the WITCH model. The time paths of 
the oil price and world oil consumption are calibrated to be almost identical to the dynamics we 
had in a previous version of the model without investments and trade of oil. As a consequence, 
the time path of GDP, consumption, investment and emissions are almost identical to what we 
have in the model without endogenous oil extraction. This allows insightful comparisons 
between scenarios obtained with the old and the new formulation of WITCH. In particular, we 
can study how global and regional stabilisation costs change when oil sector dynamics are 
modelled more appropriately. 
Our main conclusion is that with respect to previous estimates, mitigation policy costs are three 
times higher in oil exporting regions. As for oil importing countries the costs are about two 
times higher. Globally, we find that costs more than double when oil dynamics are endogenous. 
In section 2 we provide a brief overview of the WITCH model. In section 3 we present in detail 
the equations that describe the oil sector and the international market of oil and section 4 
describes calibration issues. In section 5 we compare oil sector dynamics in the reference and in 
the policy scenarios. The concluding section is used to draw an overall assessment of the 
findings presented in the paper and to present further modelling development and additional 
policy analysis that we expect to undertake in the future.   6
1.  The WITCH Model: a Brief Overview 
WITCH – World Induced Technical Change Hybrid – is a regional integrated assessment model 
structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to 
climate policies (Bosetti et al. 2006, 2009b; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007). 
It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and bottom-up modelling. 
The  top-down component consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth model in which the 
energy input of the aggregate production function has been integrated into a bottom-up like 
description of the energy sector. WITCH’s top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully 
intertemporal allocation of investments, including those in the energy sector. 
World countries are aggregated in twelve regions on the basis of geographic, economic and 
technological vicinity. The regions interact strategically on global externalities: GHGs, 
technological spillovers, and a common pool of exhaustible natural resources.
4 
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to 
produce a reasonable characterisation of future energy and technological scenarios and an 
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilising  greenhouse gases concentrations. 
In addition, by endogenously modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium), as well as 
the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate the implication of 
mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components. 
In WITCH, emissions arise from fossil fuels used in the energy sector and from land use 
changes that release carbon sequestered in biomasses and soils. Emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF 
(short-lived fluorinated gases), LLF (long-lived fluorinated) and SO2 aerosols, which have a 
cooling effect on temperature, are also identified. Since most of these gases arise from 
agricultural practices, the modelling relies on estimates for reference emissions, and a top-down 
approach for mitigation supply curves.
5 
                                                 
4 The regions are USA, WEURO (Western Europe), EEURO (Eastern Europe), KOSAU (South Korea, 
South Africa and Australia), CAJANZ (Canada, Japan and New Zealand), TE (Transition Economies), 
MENA (Middle East and South Africa), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), SASIA (South Asia), SEASIA 
(South-East Asia), CHINA, LACA (Latin America and the Caribbean). 
5 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is estimated to offer sizeable low-cost 
abatement potential. WITCH includes a baseline projection of land use CO2 emissions, as well as 
estimates of the global potential and costs for reducing emissions from deforestation, assuming that all 
tropical forest nations can join an emission trading system and have the capacity to implement REDD 
programs. However, avoided deforestation is not a source of emissions reductions in the version of the 
model that we used for this study.   7
A climate module governs the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and the temperature 
response to growing GHGs concentrations. WITCH is also equipped with a damage function 
that provides the feedback on the economy of global warming. However, in this study we 
exclude the damage function and we take the “cost-minimisation” approach: given a target in 
terms of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere, we produce scenarios that minimise the cost 
of achieving this target. 
Endogenous technological dynamics are a key feature of WITCH. Dedicated R&D investments 
increase the knowledge stock that governs energy efficiency. Learning-by-doing curves are used 
to model cost dynamics for wind and solar power capital costs. Both energy-efficiency R&D 
and learning exhibit international spillovers. There are two backstop technologies in the 
electricity sector and  the non-electricity sector  that necessitate dedicated innovation 
investments to become competitive. In line with the most recent literature, the costs of these 
backstop technologies are modelled through a so-called two-factor learning curve, in which 
their price declines both with investments in dedicated R&D and with technology diffusion. 
The base year for calibration is 2005; all monetary values are in constant 2005 USD. The 
WITCH model uses market exchange rates for international income comparisons. 
2.  The Oil Sector and the Oil Market in the WITCH Model 
In this section we describe the equations that govern the oil sector and the international oil 
market in the present enhanced version of the WICTH model. 
2.1.  Oil Demand and Oil Supply 
Crude oil is used both in the electric and in the non-electric sector in WITCH. In country n at 
time t total oil demand (OIL) is given by the sum of oil used in the electric sector (OILel) and 
non-electric sector (OILnel): 
() () () n t OIL n t OIL n t OIL nel el , , , + = . (1) 
Oil demand is covered by means of domestic production (OILprod) of each category g of oil 
and/or by means of net oil imports (NIPoil) from the international oil market: 
() ( ) () ) , ( , , , n t NIP g n t OIL n t OIL oil
g
prod + =∑ . (2)   8
In oil-exporting regions, domestic production of oil is greater than domestic consumption and 
net imports are negative. We model eight distinct extraction sectors for oil but we assume that 
oil traded internationally is a homogenous good. 
Oil production in a given year cannot exceed the extraction capacity (OILcap) cumulatively built 
in the country. Extraction capacity depreciates at the rate δ . Therefore there is space for spare 
capacity in the model: 
() () g n t OIL g n t OIL cap prod , , , , ≤ , (3) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) g n t g n t OIL g n t OIL cap cap , , 1 , , , , 1 Δ + − = + δ . (4) 
2.2. Equilibrium  in  the  International Oil Market 
Equilibrium in the international oil market requires that excess demand of oil is equal to zero at 
any given time period: 
() ∑ ∀ =
n oil t n t NIP 0 , . (5) 
2.3.  Oil and Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product 
National Net Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Y can be decomposed in oil and non-oil GDP: 
() () () n t Y n t Y n t Y OIL NONOIL , , , + = . (6) 
Net non-oil GDP is equal to gross non-oil output (GYNONOIL) net of the climate feedback (Ω), of 
the expenditure for oil and of the expenditure for other fuels:
6 
() ()




z z z OIL OIL
NONOIL
NONOIL , , ,
,
,
, ∑ − + −
Ω
= . (7) 
Oil is valued at international market prices also for regions that are net exporters. A mark-up 
(MKUPOIL) is added to the international price of oil (POIL) to account for local factors that affect 
the cost of oil for final users; the mark-up can be greater or lower than zero. XZ is a vector of 
production inputs that are assumed to be a net loss for the economy, including other fuels and 
the amount of carbon captured and stored; PZ is a vector of prices. 
                                                 
6 In our analysis we switch climate feedback off and we examine climate policy in a “costminimisation” 
framework.   9
Net oil GDP is equal to the value of conventional and non-conventional oil production, valued 
at the international price of oil: 
() () () ( ) t P g t n OIL
n t
n t Y OIL
g




, . (8) 
Consumption is equal to what remains of the economy net output Y, after subtracting investment 
in all technologies Ij , other expenditures Wk , investments in additional oil capacity extraction 
IOILCAP (for a more detailed description of the budget constraint see the Appendix). We also 
account for O&M costs associated with oil extraction: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − − − − =
k k g g OILCAP j j n t W M O g n t OILCAP g n t I n t I n t Y n t C , & , , , , , , , . (9) 
Investments for conventional and non-conventional oil extraction are equal to the expenditure 
for financing the expansion of oil capacity  ( ) g n t , , Δ , region and time specific: 
() () () g n t g n t OIL g n t I t cap OILCAP , , , , , , cos Δ = . (10) 
We assume that labour is not necessary to extract oil. This is a simplification that does not bear 
relevant implications since the oil-extraction sector is highly capital intensive.
7 
2.4.  Oil Extraction Capacity Costs 
The cost of each barrel of oil is not explicit in WITCH. It emerges in the model as a shadow 
cost of the resources invested in the oil sector. This modelling approach allows a full description 
of capital accumulation for oil extraction, but it complicates the description of oil cost 
dynamics. In fact, instead of modelling the evolution of the cost to extract a barrel of oil, we 
describe how the investment cost in extracting capacity changes when oil of a given category 
becomes scarcer or when different categories are exploited. 
The cost of oil extraction capacity is equal to the sum of three components: (1) a fixed factor,  
(2) an element that mimics short-term frictions that arise in the market when demand increases 
too fast, and (3) a module that reflects the exhaustibility of oil. In the next section we discuss 
calibration details for easier reference and we introduce the equations that govern the dynamics 
of oil extraction capacity costs.  
                                                 
7 Share of labour force in the oil sector for selected countries in 2002: United States, 0.4%; Saudi Arabia 
1.6%; China, 0.8%; Venezuela, 0.5%; Canada, 1.1%; Russian Federation, 1.8% (ILO 2010)   10
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
Resources (Bln. Barrels)
Conventional (Cat I-IV) 347 120 13 15 59 538 1341 130 20 186 76 445
Non Conventional (Cat. V-VIII) 1749 416 39 989 1823 1336 3007 331 32 1737 269 3848
Production (Bln. Barrels)
Conventional (Cat I-IV) 2.1 1.8 0.0 0.2 1.0 4.1 10.1 1.9 0.3 1.3 0.9 3.9
Non Conventional (Cat. V-VIII) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Net Exports (Bln. Barrels) -4.8 -2.8 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 2.4 7.6 1.6 -0.8 -1.4 -0.6 1.7
Consumption (Bln. Barrels) 7.0 4.6 0.5 1.2 2.6 1.7 2.5 0.3 1.1 2.7 1.5 2.3
 
Table 3. Oil Overview in 2005. 
3. Calibration 
3.1.  Oil Market Dynamics in the Base Year 
We calibrate the model to replicate base year oil production, import and export. We assume that 
oil traded internationally is homogeneous. Therefore we have a unique international oil price. 
Oil resources are derived from Rogner (1997) and they are assumed not to grow over time. Oil 
resources are distinguished in eight categories. In Table 3 we aggregate them in two categories: 
conventional oil (categories I-IV) and non-conventional oil (categories V-VIII). 
In 2005, non-conventional oil production is negligible and concentrated only in a few regions: 
Canada (CAJANZ aggregation) Brazil and Venezuela (LACA aggregation) and USA, in 
decreasing order.
8 
Oil imports and exports in the base year are calibrated using data provided by Enerdata (World 
Energy Database).
9 In 2005, USA is the largest oil importer (4.83 Billion Barrels per year), 
followed by WEURO, CAJAZ and CHINA. The largest oil exporter is MENA (7.6 Billion 
Barrels per year) followed by TE, LACA and SSA in decreasing order. An overview of the oil 
sector is given in Table 3. 
3.2.  Cost of Oil Extraction Capacity 
A correct description of the oil market is problematic for all large-scale economic models 
because they are typically unable to replicate the functioning of non-competitive markets. 
WITCH is not an exception. The players of the non-cooperative game that all regions play, in 
                                                 
8 Source of data: UNESD database (Production of Tar Sands and Oil Shales). 
9 Enerdata compiles more than 150 specialised information sources in the energy sector. All data are 
expertised with a tested statistical methodology, to provide an extensive, reliable and timely updated 
global energy market database on a single online interface.   11
WITCH behave as price-takers, not able to recognise that they can influence other players 
choices.
10 
It is then clear why a simple step cost function, as in Rogner (2007) cannot guide investment 
decisions: if the market price of oil is higher than the (implicit) cost of extracting a barrel of oil, 
there is a tendency for large resource owners to flood the market with oil supply. 
One option to circumvent this problem is to impose a complex set of rules that restricts the 
quantity of oil that can be extracted, in each region, at each point in time. Another option is to 
introduce a cost curve that has short-term increasing marginal extraction costs. We opted for the 
second option to allow greater flexibility to the investment decisions of oil producing countries. 
The cost of additional oil capacity is governed by three elements. First, each oil category has a 
specific investment cost that represents a cost floor. This represents the flat part of a step 
function. Second, we reduce the incentive to over-invest in oil extraction capacity by 
introducing a short-term cost component that inflicts severe cost increments when capacity 
addictions are above a given threshold. Third, we smooth the transition from a lower (cheaper) 
to a higher (more expensive) category of oil by introducing a cost component that is inversely 
related to remaining oil resources for each category. The second and third components of the 
cost function allow having more resource categories in use at the same time,  which is not 
possible with a simple step cost function. 
With more precision, we model the cost of additional oil extraction capacity, at time t, in region 
n, for grade g, as detailed in Equation 11: 
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) (g λ  represents the first component – the price floor – calibrated using the upper bound of the 
cost range provided by Rogner (1997) for each category of oil.
11 The second and third terms are 
                                                 
10 In the previous version of the WITCH model without investments in the oil sector and without an 
explicit formulation of the international market for oil, the oil price was still endogenous and it was 
governed by a global cost function that was based on cumulative consumption of oil. 
11 In particular, if we denote with  ) (g Γ  the extraction cost of one barrel of oil as in Rogner (1997), the 
cost of the extraction capacity that will supply one barrel of oil per year is equal to  () δ α + Γ = r g g ) ( ) ( .   12
the two power functions, which model the short-term cost component as a function of additional 
capacity  () g n t , , Δ . Their weight is limited since  ( ) g ϕ  is set equal to 4% of  ) (g λ . The parameter 
ψ  is set equal to 3. For categories II-VIII of oil, the parameter  ( ) g ζ , is calibrated so that the 
cost starts increasing at fast pace when additional capacity is higher than 0.16 billion barrels per 
year. For category I, this threshold is equal to ten percent of extraction capacity in the base year. 
Finally, the last term is a power function of the depletion rate that allows a smooth transition 
from one oil category to the other. Also  χ  is set equal to 3.  ( ) g μ  is equal to the difference 
between extraction capacity costs of category g and category g+1; the calibration is based again 
on Rogner (1997). λ  is equal to 0.5 .
12 
Parameters have been chosen to replicate realistic short- and medium-term expansion paths of 
oil supply and to obtain a path of oil price that is very close to the version of WITCH that does 
not include an explicit description of the oil sector. By pinning the oil price down to the old time 
path, investments in other technologies are largely unaffected, allowing interesting comparison 
exercises between the two versions of the model. The sensitivity analysis in Section 7 tests 
different assumptions on the value of  ( ) g ϕ  and on the amount of oil resources for each 
category. 
The existing oil capacity is subject to depreciation, with  1 . 0 = ∂  per year (see Equation 4). An 
upper bound to cumulative oil production constrains extraction below feasible levels at any 
point in time: 
() ) , , ( , ,
1
1 g n t OIL g n t OIL res
t
s prod ≤ ∑
−
= . (12) 
Operation and maintenance (O&M) costs – including lifting costs – that appear in Equation (9) 
are set equal to 10 USD per barrel for all categories of oil, in all regions.
13 
We do not model regional extraction cost curves for coal, whose price grows following a power 
law as world resources are depleted. The price of natural gas is fixed at 70% of the international 
price of oil. 
                                                 
12 This implies that when fifty percent of resources of a given oil category are depleted, if we abstract 
from the short-term cost component, the cost of additional extraction capacity of category g becomes 
almost equivalent to the extraction cost of category g+1. 
13 All monetary values are expressed in constant 2005 USD. According to EIA lifting costs for the FRS 
companies were 9.98 USD per barrel of oil equivalent of production. Source: Performance Profiles of 
Major Energy Producers 2007 – EIA December 2008. See Table 10.   13
3.3. Carbon  Emissions 
In WITCH emissions are derived from fossil fuels consumption using the average carbon 
content of each fuel. Non-conventional oil extraction is an extremely energy intensive process 
and requires a special treatment. We assume that the emissions associated to the oil traded 
internationally are the same for all categories. However, the extraction of non-conventional 
categories of oil requires higher energy use and higher emissions.
14 These emissions are 
attributed to the country in which extraction occurs. 
4.  Oil Sector Dynamics in the BaU and in the Stabilisation  
Scenarios 
This section presents  major dynamics in the oil sector in the Business-as-Usual Scenario 
(BaU).
15 We  examine how oil sector investment decisions are changed by a stabilisation policy 
aiming at stabilising  world concentrations of GHGs at 550ppmv CO2-eq. We simulate the 
climate policy in an ideal environment in which all world regions agree on the stabilisation 
target and credibly commit to achieve it at the end of the century. Regions receive emission 
allowances that can be traded in an international carbon market. The distribution of carbon 
allowances follows a contraction-and-convergence scheme at 2050, progressively shifting from 
an allocation that gives full weight to present levels of emissions to an allocation that distributes 
emissions rights proportionally to each region’s population. 
4.1. A  Global  Outlook 
In the BaU Scenario, oil consumption increases at a constant pace until mid-century, when the 
growth rate slows down but remains positive throughout the century (Figure 1). As we see with 
more detail in the Regional Outlook, which follows this sub-section, the model expects that 
additional oil consumption comes from emerging economies, especially in Asia. There is no  
shortage of oil in our BaU Scenario, thanks to a wide availability of non-conventional oil 
resources. Lower growth of oil consumption is explained by a saturation of demand in emerging 
economies and by energy efficiency improvements induced by a five-fold growth in the price of 
oil. (Figure 2). 
                                                 
14 We assume that emissions associated with the extraction of oil are a fraction  g ι  of the carbon content 
of a barrel of oil, with  [] 700 . 0 700 . 0 600 . 0 150 . 0 100 . 0 075 . 0 050 . 0 00 . 0 = ι  for the eight oil 
categories. 
15 In the BaU we assume that no policy is implemented to constrain  GHGs emissions.   14
The concerns about the imminent exhaustion of fossil fuels that have fuelled a dense debate in 
the 70’s (Meadows et al 1972) were unmotivated and the great abundance of oil, natural gas and 
coal reserves is now motivating environmental pessimism. The major constraints to fossil fuels 
extractions will probably come from voluntary policies that restrict carbon emissions in the 
atmosphere. The economics of resource extraction may have to soon convert into an economics 
of waste accumulation (Sinn 2008). 
From 58 USD per barrel in 2005, the oil price reaches, at a rather constant pace, 255 USD per 
barrel in 2105 (Figure 2). As explained in detail above, the price of oil is formed in the 
international market to equate demand and supply, at every point in time. It is the outcome of 
demand and supply forces which are endogenously determined in the model. In the previous 
version of WITCH, as well as in many other IAMs, the price was formed using a reduced form 
cost function based on cumulative extraction. Here we obtain the positive relationship between 
scarcity and oil price endogenously which fits well with historical observations, without the 
need to use a reduced cost function (Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
Regional social planners are forward looking agents who optimally plan the expansion path of 
the oil sector, assessing future oil prices and the future cost of oil extraction capacity (which 
evolves according to Equation 11). As they move from easily accessible oil resources to heavy 
non-conventional oils, the cost of extraction capacity increases and the supply function tilts 
upward. Figure 5 shows how the weighted average cost of extraction capacity increases over 
time. Figure 6 relates the cost to cumulative oil production. The large availability of non-
conventional oil resources allows an almost linear relationship between cumulative production 
and costs, with the slope roughly equal to one. 
Decisions on the optimal capacity of oil in place at each point in time drive investments in new 
oil fields. Figure 7 gives information on how additional oil extraction capacity evolves over 
time. In the BaU Scenario, extraction capacity expands at a regular pace until mid-century when 
new additions peak at 4.7 billion barrels per year. After 2050, new extraction capacity is used to 

















































































































Figure 3   16
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Figure 4 
The Stabilisation Scenario is constructed assuming that all regions agree on a global trajectory 
of emissions to stabilise  GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere at 550ppm CO2-eq at the end 
of the century. The policy tool used is a global emissions trading system that allows separating  
efficiency and equity considerations (Coase 1960). Different stabilisation targets could be used, 
but the focus of this paper is to provide an illustrative example of the new model specification 
rather than estimating the implications of a specific policy target. We do not show the time path 
of carbon price that endogenously emerges from the international trading scheme. It is sufficient 
to mention that it starts from 3.5 $/CO2-eq in 2010, it reaches 69 $/CO2-eq in 2030, 529 $/CO2-
eq in 2050 and eventually ramps up to 1326 $/CO2 in 2100. This entails a heavy “carbon 
burden” on each barrel of oil, as we show in Figure 2, where we plot the cost to cover with 
emissions permits emissions from each barrel of oil (right axis) together with the international 
oil price (left axis). In 2010, it is necessary to spend 1.5$ in carbon credits per each barrel of oil, 
about 2% of the price of oil. In 2030, it is necessary to spend 30$ per barrel of oil, 37% of the 
price of oil. In 2050, the cost of carbon increases  to 225$ per barrel, an astonishingly 300% of 
oil price. Between 2035 and 2040, the expenditure for carbon becomes equivalent to that of  oil 
extraction. It is then of stark evidence that the scarce and valuable commodity is carbon 
(underground) in a Stabilisation Scenario and not the fossil resource. We have not included in 
the carbon burden the additional cost to cover emissions from the extraction process of non-
conventional oil resources. This consumption is a luxury that the world cannot afford if it wants 
to stabilise concentrations of GHGs at safe levels.   17
















































































































Figure 7   18
Therefore, consumption of oil falls dramatically from 2025 onward, with a five-fold contraction 
at 2105, with respect to the BaU Scenario (Figure 1). Interestingly, in the first years, oil 
consumption increases slightly with respect to the BaU Scenario. This only partly confirms the 
theoretical postulate of the “green paradox”, advocated by Sinn (2008). We are in fact 
examining a global commitment to reduce GHGs, with stringent caps on emissions worldwide. 
The anticipation of extraction is therefore not the effect of carbon leakage, but rather a mild, 
short term effect in which a lower discounted value of resources in the future induce faster 
extraction in the present, at global level, inducing substitution effects in the energy mix. 
Additions of extraction capacity anticipate the movements of oil supply in the Stabilisation 
scenario and peak around 2015. A closer look at Figure 7 shows that additional capacity in the 
first years is higher in the Stabilisation Scenario than in the BaU, allowing higher consumption 
of oil in the early phases of the Stabilisation policy. 
The price of oil in the Stabilisation scenario (Figure 2) is always lower than in the BaU 
Scenario. At 2105, the oil price is fifty percent lower than in the BaU Scenario. Interestingly, in 
the Stabilisation scenario, costs grow at a slower pace than in the BaU Scenario if mapped 
against cumulative extraction (Figure 6). This is explained by the presence of the short-term 
cost component that mimics frictions that arise when there is a fast expansion of the oil sector. 
Not only is less oil consumed in the Stabilisation scenario, but the oil sector also shrinks and 
this leads to a less than proportional relationship between cumulative extraction and costs. 
With its new specification WITCH endogenously determines investment decisions in eight 
different types of extraction capacity, one for each of the eight categories of oil. The allocation 
of investments is based on the equalisation of marginal returns of extraction capital across the 
eight different categories of oil. Since the model is forward looking, investment decisions 
incorporate future developments of extraction capacity costs, of the oil price, total resources 
available and of the returns to all other investments in the economy. The mix of investments is 
therefore the output of a complex optimisation exercise and it deserves a closer look. 
Figure 8 gives a synthetic representation of how oil production shifts from one category to the 
other as time goes by. The light coloured area corresponds to conventional oil resources while 
the dark area to non-conventional ones. As time goes by, cheap and easy-to-access oil resources 
are depleted, with a conventional oil peak around 2045. Oil consumption, however, can be 
fuelled by non-conventional oil, which is available in large quantities.   19











































In the Stabilisation Scenario, conventional oil resources are sufficient to cover oil demand, as 
shown in Figure 9. Oil resources that are easy to access and cheap to extract will cover world oil 
consumption. This gives a relative advantage to the Middle East and North Africa region, where 
most of the first quality oil resources are located. However, overall extraction in these countries 
declines, as well as the oil price, determining a sharp contraction of the value added in the oil 
sector. 
Figure 10 further explores the dynamics of oil extraction in the BaU and in the Stabilisation 
Scenario. The total production of oil from each category is plotted together with total resources 
available for that category. While categories 1 to 5 are almost depleted in the BaU Scenario, 
categories 6 to 7 show very wide margins for higher consumption. In the Stabilisation Scenario 
oil demand is heavily reduced but consumption does not disappear altogether. Categories 1 to 2 
will still be depleted, with the last oil coming from category 3. Unconventional oil and 
expensive conventional oil resources are not extracted.  Figure 11 and Figure 12 provide a
closer look at the data with greater time detail. Here we display the share of resources for each 
category that is extracted at 2030, 2050 and 2100. 60% of resources from Category 1 are already 
consumed at 2030, and more than 80% at mid-century. Category 2 follows suit, while large 
margins remain at 2050, for all other categories. In 2030, non-conventional oil resources are 
almost intact. At the end of the century, categories 1 and 2 are exhausted, category 3 is almost 
exhausted, and wide margins remain for capacity expansion in categories 4-8. In the 
Stabilisation Scenario the picture changes radically for categories 3-8, but the exhaustion path of 
categories 1-2 remains unchanged.   20
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Figure 10 





















Figure 11   21























































































Figure 14   22
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
BaU
2005 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 16% 44% 27% 1% 3% 5% 9%
2025 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 15% 37% 14% 1% 2% 3% 7%
2 0 5 0 2 %1 %1 %5 %4 % 1 3 % 3 0 % 8 %0 %2 %2 %5 %
2075 2% 1% 3% 11% 8% 17% 18% 5% 0% 2% 2% 5%
2100 3% 1% 1% 15% 12% 16% 14% 3% 0% 2% 4% 4%
Stab
2005 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 16% 44% 27% 1% 3% 5% 9%
2025 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 12% 31% 10% 0% 1% 2% 6%
2050 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
2 0 7 5 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %3 %5 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %
2 1 0 0 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %2 %1 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %
 
Table 4. Oil GDP (% of total GDP) 
 
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
BaU
2005 2% 1% 3% 2% 1% 33% 64% 36% 4% 6% 10% 16%
2025 3% 1% 2% 3% 4% 23% 60% 29% 2% 4% 7% 10%
2050 5% 1% 1% 18% 12% 31% 40% 11% 0% 6% 3% 10%
2075 5% 2% 0% 22% 16% 31% 32% 10% 0% 5% 6% 9%
2100 5% 4% 5% 29% 23% 30% 27% 2% 0% 6% 17% 7%
Stab
2005 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 33% 62% 38% 4% 6% 10% 16%
2025 2% 1% 5% 1% 1% 15% 51% 19% 1% 3% 4% 6%
2050 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2075 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
2100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1%
 
Table 5. Oil Investments (% of total Investments) 
Under climate policy, a major incentive to keep unconventional oil resources untouched comes 
from the high consumption of fossil fuels in the extraction process, as it emerges from an 
analysis of Figure 13 and Figure 14. The amount of emissions associated with the extraction of 
categories 6, 7 and 8 is extremely high, increasing from 60 to 70 percent the emissions content 
of each barrel of oil consumed in the economy (See Footnote 14 at p. 2). The real threat for our 
century is not the scarcity of oil, but rather the possibility that relatively inexpensive 
unconventional oil might cause enormous growth of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere. 
We abstract  from further considerations on other negative externalities in the environment for 
example, on water and biodiversity  that a large exploitation of unconventional oil might arise. 
These negative externalities might in fact limit the use of non-conventional oil well below the 
optimal path in our BaU Scenario. For this reason we generate a BaU and a Stabilisation 
Scenario in which non-conventional oil is not used in the sensitivity analysis presented in 
Section 5.   23
An interesting feature of our modelling approach is the possibility to monitor how investments 
in the oil sector evolve across time. We can therefore study the optimal transition pathway to the 
new equilibrium allocation of investments. 
For big oil producing countries, climate policy requires a strong reallocation of investments 
away from oil extraction. So far the analysis of the economic consequences of this radical 
transformation of oil-based economies has been too often overlooked. Also the wide range geo-
political implications of an imperfect adaptation to the new economic conditions have been 
neglected. For example, if Northern African and Middle Eastern countries  fail to thoroughly 
restructure their economies, a high immigration pressure might arise along the Mediterranean 
basin. It is not our intent to explore these far reaching implications of climate policy. We  leave 
them for further research. We rather provide a representation of basic dynamics of oil and non-
oil GDP, as well as of investments, in the BaU and in the Stabilisation Scenarios. 
In the BaU Scenario the share of GDP of oil exporting regions from the oil sector remains 
roughly stable around 6%, reflecting a balanced expansion of the economies (Table 4). The oil 
sector is particularly capital intensive and therefore absorbs a higher share of total investments 
than other economic activities. The share of total investments (Table 5)  that go to the oil sector 
increases until mid-century, when the sector absorbs 16% of total investments in oil exporting 
countries. However, in the second part of the century the relative share declines and the 
economies begin to expand more the non-oil sector. The contribution of the oil sector to the 
overall economy remains high thanks to a growing price of oil. 
The Stabilisation Scenario shows a very different pattern of the optimal distribution of 
economic activity between the two sectors (Table 4 and Table 5). Investments in the oil sector 
decline rapidly and become irrelevant from a macro-economic point of view, even for regions 
that remain big oil exporters in the Stabilisation Scenario (MENA, TE and LACA). By allowing 
full flexibility to restructure the economy (the two sectors add up linearly), the model describes 
an optimistic condition in which there is no restraint to reallocate resources away from oil 
production. Each region can freely redirect investments in order to maximise returns. The model 
also displays perfect foresight. Therefore social planners in oil producing regions can plan the 
transition to a new economic paradigm with large advance. However, the collapse of the 
international demand of oil drastically reduces aggregate demand in oil exporting regions and 
this represents a net loss that they cannot cope with. The inflow of capital from importing 
countries is a source of revenue that they are not able to replace.   24
A few caveats apply to these conclusions. First, as already discussed above, we are unable to 
model the large oil rents in regions like MENA where extraction costs are well below the 
international price of oil. A wise, long-term, economic planning can build the basis for the 
growth of the non-oil sector. We might underestimate this effect, but the dynamic of our BaU 
Scenario already shows that economies will optimally move away from the oil sector. The 
degree to which a better model specification might deliver milder effects of the Stabilisation 
policy on total economic activity is therefore unclear. Second, we are not modelling the market 
for natural gas with the same degree of detail as in the oil market. In the short-term, the effort to 
reduce carbon emissions might push to substitute gas fired to coal fired power plants worldwide, 
determining a short- to medium-term expansion of gas demand. Since oil production countries 
are also natural gas producers, the gasification of power supply might mitigate the contraction 
of oil demand. If it will be economical and technologically feasible to run gas-fired power plants 
with CCS, natural gas might have an even larger role in the long-term. Third, we do not model  
the possibility to generate electricity by means of concentrated solar power plants in Northern 
Africa and to ship it by means of super grids to Europe (Battaglini et al. 2008; Trieb 2006). The 
revenues from the international trade of electricity might trigger a prosperous business in 
Northern African countries, however, from preliminary results obtained with a new version of 
the WITCH model. The value of this new market is likely to be several orders of magnitude 
smaller than the market of oil (Massetti and Ricci 2010). 
4.2.  A Regional Outlook 
The distribution of conventional and non-conventional oil resources is uneven across regions. 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have the highest share of conventional oil reserves (see 
Table 3), with 41% of total resources; Transition Economies (TE) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LACA) follow with 16% and 14%, respectively. The regions with the largest 
resources of non-conventional oil are Venezuela (in the Latin America and Caribbean, LACA, 
regional aggregation), the Middle East (aggregated with North Africa in the MENA regional 
aggregation), Canada (aggregated together with Japan and New Zealand in the CAJANZ 
region), the United States (USA) and China. The endowment of oil resources directly affects 
production patterns , shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 . In the BaU Scenario, large resources of 
conventional oil allow MENA to remain the largest oil producer throughout the century. The 
share of global oil production grows from 36% in 2005 to 38% in 2035; after 2040, the 
exploitation of non-conventional oil resources allows other regions to gain shares of the market.   25
MENA remains the largest oil producer in the world, but its share declines to 20% at the end of 
the century. LACA and TE lose some shares of the market declining from 15% to 11% between 
2025 and 2065, but the race to non-conventional oil allows them to regain the initial 15% by the 
end of the century. The USA and CAJAZ gain large shares of global oil production during the 
century: the USA moves from 7.6% to 12.6%, CAJAZ from 4% to 13.5%. The increase of total 
oil production in 2100, with respect to 2005, is equal to 240% in the USA, 575% in CAJAZ, 
74% in TE, 10% in MENA, 300% in CHINA, 80% in LACA. Sub-Saharan Africa represents an 
exception, with a contraction of 77%. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) gives a synthetic 
measure of the degree of concentration in the global oil market. If we denote with  i s  the market 
share of region i, then  ∑ = =
N
i i s HHI
1 , with  1 1 ≤ ≤ HHI N . The closer the HHI is to 1, the greater  
the concentration is in the market. In our case, with  12 = N  we have  1 083 . 0 ≤ ≤ HHI . In the BaU 
Scenario the concentration of the oil market remains stable with an HHI around 0.20 until 2050, 
and then it declines smoothly until the HHI becomes equal to 0.12 at the end of the century. 
This implies that in a world in which it is possible to use the abundant resources of non-
conventional oil, production becomes more evenly distributed across macro-regions than it is 
today. Issues related to strategic security of supply and geo-political considerations might 
become less relevant than they are in the present. 
The regional distribution of oil consumption is depicted in Figure 15. At the beginning of the 
century oil consumption is more evenly spread among regions than oil production. The block of 
high-income regions (USA, WEURO, EEURO, KOSAU and CAJAZ) account for 56.5% of 
world demand, with the rest going to Transition and Developing economies. China has a soaring 
consumption of oil, but at 2005, it requires only 10% of global demand, while the USA absorbs 
one quarter of global oil production. As developing regions expand their economies oil 
consumption increases in absolute numbers and in share. They overtake high- income 
economies as early as 2025, and they absorb about two thirds of global production at the end of 
the century. Global oil consumption becomes more evenly distributed among world regions. 
The HHI index for consumption declines from 0.13 to 0.12, in the BaU Scenario, during the 
century. 
Trade patterns are determined by the imbalances between national production and national 
consumption and are described in Figure 16 and Figure 17. In the BaU Scenario MENA 
dominates the oil market throughout the century, with decreasing prominence during the second 
half of the century, when it is followed by TE, Canada in the CAJAZ region and Australia   26
(aggregated with Korea and South Africa, KOSAU aggregation). Oil imports are directed 
towards the USA, Western Europe (WEURO) and developing Asia until mid-century; 
afterwards, CAJAZ becomes a self producer, Western Europe and the USA continues to buy 
substantial amounts of oil and India (aggregated with Pakistan and other South Asian states, 
SASIA aggregation) becomes the largest oil importer, followed by CHINA. Interestingly, at the 
end of the century the greatest part of international trade of oil will be directed towards Asian 
economies (CHINA, SASIA and EASIA), accounting for 68% of global oil imports. 
While world consumption of oil doubles during the century, the volume of oil traded 
internationally increases only by 60%, as depicted in Figure 18. This is explained by a growing 
proximity of production and consumption areas, thanks to the exploitation of vast non-
conventional oil resources in countries with high domestic demand. The value of oil traded 
internationally, measured as the volume of oil times the price that emerges from the market, 
continues to increase  thanks to the growing price of oil. MENA, TE, CAJAZ and LACA are the 
regions that absorb the largest part of the financial flows from oil trade and for this reason they 
are also the regions that are affected the most in the Stabilisation Scenario. 
The regional outlook of the oil sector changes dramatically in the Stabilisation Scenario. Oil 
consumption (Figure 20) drops substantially in all regions, with respect to the BaU Scenario. 
With respect to 2005, aggregate consumption of Transition and Developing economies grows 
until 2025, while consumption in high-income economies peaks as early as 2015. At the end of 
the century our Stabilisation Scenario shows that 95% of oil is consumed in Transition and 
Developing economies. 
Also production of oil changes substantially under climate policy. Non-conventional oil is 
extracted only in minimal quantity and MENA with TE are able to supply all oil needed until 
the end of the century. MENA countries dominate the oil market, as depicted in Figure 22, and 
oil production is more concentrated than in the BaU Scenario. The HHI peaks in 2060, with a 
value equal to 0.45 and it then declines to the level of 2005. The dominance of MENA countries 
is even more marked if we consider international trade flows of oil. Between 2040 and 2085 
international oil trade is a business of only two macro-regions: the Middle East and North 
Africa and Transition Economies. The rest of oil producing countries tends to satisfy the 
(modest) oil demand in autarchy. Imports see a lower regional dispersion than in the BaU 
Scenario (Figure 23), with India (in SASIA) dominating the market in 2105.   27





































































































































































































































































Figure 20   29






















































































































































Figure 23   30






















Stab G1-G8 BaU G1-G8  
Figure 24 
The pattern of oil production triggered by the stabilisation policy entails that CHINA and the 
USA increase their reliance on foreign oil to supply their domestic consumption over the 
century (see Figure 24 and Table 6 for greater regional and temporal detail). In Western Europe, 
the share of oil consumption imported from other regions increases from 61% to 81% in 2075 
(Table 6). If we take the ratio of foreign to domestic production as an indicator of the security of 
oil supply, the stabilisation policy increases, rather than reducing, the dependence from 
traditional oil exporters. However, the total demand of oil decreases substantially in the 
Stabilisation Scenario, to become an irrelevant component of total primary energy supply 
(TPES) at the end of the century (Table 6). MENA, LACA and TE will dominate a market that 
rapidly shrinks but they are net losers and their grip on the energy systems of Europe, the USA 
and China is doomed to vanish. 
Climate policy induces a contraction of oil production that is not equal across regions. Regions 
with large resources of non-conventional oil are those in which production drops the most for 
two reasons.  First of all, there is a global contraction of oil demand that reduces the need to use 
expensive non-conventional oil resources. Second, the stabilisation policy penalises non-
conventional oil with respect to conventional oil, due to the large amount of emissions 
associated with the extraction process. Figure 24 and Figure 25 synthesise the contraction of the 
oil extraction in the twelve regions of WITCH. Conventional oil rich regions like MENA, TE 
and LACA have a sharp contraction of oil production, but not as dramatic as in the USA and in 
the CAJAZ aggregate. Preventing the exploitation of non-conventional oil in countries that are 
presently not large exporters of oil, the stabilisation policy concentrates oil extraction in 
traditional oil exporting regions such as, MENA, TE and LACA. 


























































Energy Security: Share of Cumulative Oil Imports over 
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USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
Share of oil Imports on Oil Consumption
BaU
2005 69% 61% 95% 81% 56% 0% 0% 0% 75% 52% 37% 0%
2025 49% 65% 43% 78% 55% 0% 0% 0% 87% 63% 66% 0%
2050 35% 67% 68% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 93% 61% 73% 0%
2075 37% 55% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 98% 50% 64% 0%
2100 30% 48% 77% 0% 0% 0% 0% 31% 99% 52% 45% 0%
Stab
2005 69% 61% 95% 81% 56% 0% 0% 0% 75% 52% 37% 0%
2025 36% 59% 71% 73% 53% 0% 0% 0% 90% 71% 63% 0%
2050 51% 78% 57% 85% 79% 0% 0% 57% 96% 82% 87% 29%
2075 26% 81% 0% 68% 0% 0% 0% 77% 98% 60% 96% 35%
2 1 0 0 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 7 2 % 9 8 % 0 % 8 2 % 0 %
Share of oil Consumption on TPES
BaU
2005 46% 48% 30% 40% 52% 25% 59% 38% 23% 22% 46% 47%
2025 44% 47% 30% 39% 50% 23% 52% 40% 35% 29% 50% 47%
2050 41% 44% 29% 39% 47% 21% 43% 40% 35% 29% 48% 44%
2075 38% 40% 27% 38% 43% 19% 37% 37% 31% 27% 43% 40%
2100 37% 37% 26% 39% 42% 17% 32% 34% 29% 25% 40% 36%
Stab
2005 46% 48% 30% 40% 52% 25% 59% 38% 23% 22% 46% 47%
2025 44% 43% 36% 47% 49% 25% 50% 40% 43% 38% 53% 48%
2050 19% 17% 11% 20% 18% 4% 23% 26% 28% 19% 32% 27%
2 0 7 5 7 %3 %0 %5 %1 %0 % 1 1 % 2 2 % 1 8 % 9 % 1 8 % 1 6 %
2 1 0 0 3 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %8 % 2 0 % 1 2 % 4 % 1 1 % 1 1 %
 
Table 6. Energy Security Indicators. 
 
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA WORLD OIL EXP OIL IMP
WITCH OIL -3.5% -1.5% -4.6% -7.2% -4.2% -17.9% -19.6% 12.7% 3.7% -6.8% -0.3% -8.3% -4.3% -8.1% -3.3%
WITCH -2.4% -0.3% -3.6% -3.1% -1.4% -9.0% -6.0% 18.8% 5.1% -5.0% 1.4% -4.3% -1.7% -2.5% -1.3%
 
Table 7. Discounted Stabilisation Policy Costs (3% declining). 
The implications in terms of GDP losses of the collapse of the oil market, and especially of the 
non-conventional oil market, under a stabilisation policy are represented in Table 7. Oil 
exporting regions have a dramatic contraction of economic activity.
16 MENA and TE lose, 
respectively, the 19.6% and 17.9% of their GDP. Non-conventional oil rich Canada (in 
CAJANZ) suffers a sharp contraction (-4.2%) due to the collapse of non-conventional oil 
extraction. The USA suffers much more than Western Europe because of income losses in the 
non-conventional oil sector. Oil rich countries like LACA, KOSAU and CHINA are also 
severely affected regions. Compared to previous stabilisation cost estimates (see Bosetti et al 
2009), we find that stabilisation costs in major oil-exporting regions increase considerably. In 
TE stabilisation costs double and in MENA they are more than three times bigger than what 
                                                 
16 Oil exporting regions are KOSAU, CAJANZ, TE, MENA, SSA, LACA. Stabilisation costs (benefits) 
are calculated as the discounted sum of the GDP difference between the BaU and the Stabilization   
Scenario. The discount rate used starts at 3% in 2005, and then declines throughout  the century. Costs are 
finally expressed as a share of discounted GDP.   33
previously estimated. Globally, stabilisation costs double when oil extraction and trade are 
modelled. 
5. Sensitivity  Analysis 
The results presented in the previous section are subject to a number of limitations. As 
mentioned above, the major modelling weakness concerns the lack of an appropriate description 
of the non -competitive structure in the international oil market. The functional form that we 
choose to describe the cost of new extraction capacity reduces the incentive to expand extraction 
capacity when oil extraction costs are low but, as a downside, it probably overestimates the 
investments needed in the oil sector. Oil rents result, therefore, lower than in the real world, and 
welfare losses that arise from the stabilisation policy might be underestimated. Changing 
functional forms requires either to use a traditional step function or to model a non-competitive 
international oil market. The first solution would necessitate a set of exogenous assumptions 
governing the pace and distribution of oil extraction, something that we want to avoid because it 
is not coherent with the flexible nature of the model in which investments are determined 
endogenously. The second solution appears to be complex and is left for future analysis. 
Therefore, in this section we fix  the functional forms used to describe the oil sector and we test 
alternative assumptions on the amount of oil resources available in each region and on the 
parameter  () g ζ , the threshold beyond which expanding the extraction capacity of oil in the 
short-term becomes increasingly expensive. The BaU and the Stabilisation Scenario that we 
have illustrated in the previous sections represent the “Central Case” around which we test 
alternative assumptions. 
We test the robustness of our results with respect to the amount of oil resources available with 
two exercises. In the first, we change all oil categories of oil proportionally. In the second 
exercise, we assume that the highest-grade resources are not available. We start subtracting 
resources of category 8, and then we increasingly reduce the amount of oil resources by one 
category until only conventional oil remains. We favour tests that reduce the amount of oil 
resources because the resource base estimated in Rogner (1997) is quite large and includes large 
quantities of non-conventional oil. 
Sensitivity analysis on the parameter  ( ) g ϕ  is performed by selecting values in a symmetric 
interval around the central value. Table 8 summarises the 14 sensitivity analysis scenarios that 
are under examination. For each one we produce a BaU and a Stabilisation Scenario.   34
5.1.  Sensitivity Analysis: the BaU Scenario 
Figure 27 shows the range that we find for the international price of oil in the BaU Scenario. 
The sharpest divergence with respect to the central case emerges when all non-conventional oil 
resources are unavailable (4-8 Cat.). The biggest price increase (three times higher than in the 
Central scenario) is found when resource category 4 becomes unavailable, signalling that the 
cheapest non-conventional oil has a major role to fuel a large expansion of oil demand 
throughout the century. The lowest price path is found when oil resources of all categories are 
augmented by 25%. Assumptions on the parameterisation of the cost function are less important 
than those on the amount of oil resources. 
In Figure 29 we notice how global investment in the oil sector varies in the different sensitivity 
scenarios. Interestingly, the two scenarios with limited oil resources (R050 and 4-8 Cat.) lead to 
very different results. When we reduce resources of all oil categories by fifty percent (R50 
scenario) the scarcity component of the cost function determines a quick expansion of extraction 
costs. Contrarily, when we assume that non-conventional oil resources are unavailable, the cost 
function of oil extraction capacity for categories 1-3 is not affected, but total oil supply is 
drastically reduced. In this case, the oil that remains to discover is not expensive, but is limited. 
In the R50 case there is more oil available, but the average extraction cost is higher because less 
abundant cheap resources (Cat 1-3) push oil exploration towards expensive non-conventional 
oil. 
 
Name of the Scenario: Description:
R125 Oil resources multiplied by 1.25 (all categories)
R075 Oil resources multiplied by 0.75 (all categories)
R050 Oil resources multiplied by 0.5 (all categories)
Esp 1.3 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 1.3
Esp 1.2 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 1.2
Esp 1.1 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 1.1
Esp 0.9 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 0.9
Esp 0.8 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 0.8
Esp 0.7 Parameter ζ  of the cost function multiplied by 0.7
8 Cat. Category of oil 8: assumed to be equal to zero
7-8 Cat. Category of oil from 7 to 8: assumed to be equal to zero
6-8 Cat. Category of oil from 6 to 8: assumed to be equal to zero
5-8 Cat. Category of oil from 5 to 8: assumed to be equal to zero
4-8 Cat. Category of oil from 4 to 8: assumed to be equal to zero
 
Table 8. Sensitivity scenarios.   35

















































































































































Figure 29   36
















































































































































Figure 32   37
Figure 29 shows global consumption of oil under the alternative scenarios. If all non-
conventional oil categories are not available, the price of oil increases substantially and oil 
consumption declines a great deal. Without unconventional oil supply peaks between 2025 and 
2030. 
5.2.  Sensitivity Analysis: The Stabilisation Scenario 
Under that Stabilisation policy the variance of the oil price around the central case is much 
lower than in the BaU case. Oil consumption is constrained by the cap on emissions and 
significant divergence emerges only when the contraction of oil resources affects also categories 
1-3, as in the R50 scenario. Non-conventional oil is not consumed in the
stabilisation scenario and therefore different assumptions on the amount of resources have 
limited impact on oil price (Figure 30). The same reasoning explains why oil investments are 
not sensitive to different assumptions on oil availability and on the parameterisation of the cost 
function (Figure 31). 
5.3.  Sensitivity Analysis: A Regional Outlook 
From a regional perspective, Figure 33and Figure 34 show that MENA remains the largest 
producer and exporter of oil in all scenarios that we examine in this sensitivity analysis. When 
resources of non-conventional oil are restricted, the USA, CAJAZ, TE and LACA experience 
the sharpest contraction of oil production, as expected. MENA and TE are the main oil 
exporting regions in all scenarios. CAJAZ and KOSAU export oil only when non-conventional 
resources are available. The USA is always net oil importers. 
When GHGs emissions are constrained, both cumulative oil production and cumulative net 
imports are rather constant across the different scenario, as shown in Figure 32 and Figure 35. 
A world with a lower amount of oil resources is a world in which a stabilisation policy of GHGs 
in the atmosphere to reduce global warming is less costly. If we measure the discounted cost of 
the policy as the fraction of discounted GDP that is lost to reduce GHGs emissions, the size of 
the oil sector is smaller and the penalty inflicted on the economies by the stabilisation policy is 
lower.   38


































































































































































Figure 35   39

































Figure 36 illustrates the impact of the alternative scenarios of our sensitivity analysis by 
showing the upper and lower bound of stabilisation policy costs estimates. While the lower 
bound always corresponds to the case in which non-conventional oil resources are not available 
(4-8 Cat.), the upper bound varies from region to region. In some cases it coincides with a 
scenario in which oil is abundant (R125) and in others it corresponds to a scenario in which oil 
of any category is scarcer (R050). Interestingly, WEURO incurs in basically zero costs and in 
the USA the costs are more than halved when non-conventional oil is not available. At global 
level, the cost of the stabilisation policy seems to be quite sensitive to assumptions on the 
availability of the least cost non-conventional oil. This reveals that an accurate description of 
fossil fuels extraction sectors is needed to assess the macroeconomic consequences of a 
stabilisation policy. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we model trade of oil among regions in the WITCH model. We model endogenous 
investments in eight different oil categories. Oil is traded internationally at a price that clears 
supply and demand in each time period. The cost of additional oil capacity is region-specific 
and accounts for both long-term exhaustibility and for short-term frictions that might arise in the 
supply chain when too much capacity is installed in a short time period.   40
Our main result shows that by introducing a detailed description of the oil sector global 
stabilisation costs increase significantly and the regional distribution of those costs shifts 
towards oil-exporting regions. 
This result bears important political consequences: climate policy is expected to reshape the 
geo-politics in oil rich areas of the world. Oil-rich countries will have a strong incentive not to 
participate in any climate agreement, if not adequately compensated for their losses. In 
particular, it is possible to imagine that oil-rich countries have the power to seriously jeopardise 
any climate agreement by flooding the market with abundant oil supply. Oil prices might drop, 
eventually inducing big oil consumers to deviate from the climate agreement. 
At this stage of development of the model we have not introduced coal-to-liquids technologies, 
which might become competitive with non-conventional oil. We also have not accurately 
modelled coal markets and natural gas markets. In particular, large amounts of unconventional 
gas reserves will potentially play a major role as substitutes of conventional oil in the second 
part of the century. We are also aware that oil markets are not competitive and oil-exporting 
countries do not play a Nash game. Rather, strategic considerations drive substantial decisions 
on oil supply and on investments to expand extraction capacity. Ideally, a new algorithm must 
be developed to account for strategic interactions and we reserve this for future work.   41
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Appendix 
7.1.  List of Main Equations 
In this Appendix we reproduce the main equations of the model. For a full description of the model please 
refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) and Bosetti et al (2009). The website www.witchmodel.org 
contains useful information on the model. The list of variables is reported at the end of this Section. In 
each region, indexed by n, a social planner maximises the following utility function: 
[] [ ] { } ∑ ∑ = =
t t
t R t n c t n L t R t n L t n C U n W ) ( ) , ( log ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ), , ( ) ( , (A1) 
where t are 5-year time spans and the pure time preference discount factor is given by: 
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t n c =  
is per capita consumption. 
 
Oil and Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product: 
National Net Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Y can be decomposed in oil (  YOIL ) and non-oil GDP 
( YNONOIL ): 
() () () n t Y n t Y n t Y OIL NONOIL , , , + = . (A3) 
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The non-oil sector 
Output gross of climate change damages, in the non-oil sector, is produced by combining a capital-labour 
intermediate input with energy services (ES) in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function: 
() () ( )()() () () () ( )
Y
Y Y t n ES n t n L t n K n t n TFP t n GY Y Y NONOIL
ρ
ρ ρ β β α α
/ 1
1 , 1 , , , , ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + =
− . (A9) 
Total factor productivity  () t n TFP ,  evolves exogenously with time. The labour force is set equal to 
population (L), which evolves exogenously. Capital (K) evolves following a standard pattern: 
( ) () ( ) () t n I t n  K   t n K GY , 1 , 1 , + − = + δ  (A10) 
Energy services are an aggregate of energy (EN) and a stock of knowledge combined with a CES 
function: 
( ) () () []
ES ES ES t n EN n t n HE n t n ES EN HE
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , + = . (A11) 
Energy is a combination of electric (EL) and non-electric energy (NEL): 
( ) () () []
EN EN EN t n NEL n t n EL n t n EN NEL EL
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , + = . (A12) 
Each factor is further decomposed into several sub-components that are aggregated using CES, linear and 
Leontief production functions. 
New ideas which contribute to the stock of energy knowledge,  ( ) t n ZHE , , are produced using R&D 
investments,  () t n I D R , & , together with the previously cumulated knowledge stock  () t n HE , : 
()
d c b
HE HE t n HKL t n HE t n I  a   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , = . (A13) 
The knowledge stock evolves as follows: 
() t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n HE , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ  (A14) 
 
The oil sector 
We reproduce here the equations that have been illustrated in the main text of the paper for an easy 
reference: 
() () () n t OIL n t OIL n t OIL nel el , , , + =  (A15) 




() () g n t OIL g n t OIL cap prod , , , , ≤
, (A17) 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) g n t g n t OIL g n t OIL cap cap , , 1 , , , , 1 Δ + − = + δ
. (A18) 
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1
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t
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−
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Climate Module 
Carbon dioxide emissions from combustion of fossil fuels ( ) f X  are derived applying stoichiometric 
coefficients to the total amount of fossil fuels utilised. Emissions associated to production of oil 
categories 2-8 are also tracked. By using carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) it is possible to reduce 
the amount of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere: 
() () ( ) ( ) t n CCS g t n OIL t n X t n CO
g prod CO g f f CO f , , , , ,
2 2 , , 2 − + = ∑ ∑ φ ω . (A21) 
For details on land use emissions and on non-CO2 gases please see Bosetti et al (2009). 
The damage function impacting output is quadratic function of the temperature increase above the pre-
industrial level T: 
( ) () () ( )
2
, 2 , 1 1 , t T t T t n n n θ θ + + = Ω . (A22) 
Temperature increases through augmented radiating forcing  F , moderated by the cooling effect of SO2 
aerosols,  () 1 + t cool : 
()( ) () ( ) ( ) [] {} ( ) 1 1 1 2 1 + − − − − + + = + t cool T t T t T t F t T t T LO σ λ σ . (A23) 
 
List of Variables 
Ω = Climate feedback on the economy 
δ = Depreciation rate 
C = Consumption 
c = Per-capita consumption  
CCS = CO2 captured and sequestered 
CO2= Emissions from combustion of fossil fuels 
Δ = Additional oil capacity 
EL = Electric energy 
EN = Energy 
ES = Energy services 
F = Radiative forcing 
GYNONOIL = Non oil GDP net of climate change impacts 
HE = Energy knowledge 
IOILCAP = Investments in additional oil capacity 
ΙR&D = Investment in energy R&D 
Ι  = Investment in the final good sector 
L = Population 
Κ = Stock of capital in the final good sector 
MKUPOIL = Regional Mark-up on international price of oil  
NEL = Non-electric energy 
NIP = Net import of carbon permits 
NIPoil= Net import of oil 
O&M_COSTS = Operation and maintenance costs associated with oil extraction 
OIL = Total consumption of oil 
OILcap = Domestic oil capacity 
OILcapcost = Investment cost per barrel of additional capacity  
OILel = Oil used in electricity generation   46
OILnel = Oil used in the non-electric sector 
OILprod = Domestic oil production 
OILres = Oil resources 
p = Price of carbon permits 
POIL = International price of oil 
PZ = a vector of prices for the input vector XZ 
R = Discount factor 
T = Temperature level 
ΤFP = Total factor productivity 
U = Instantaneous utility 
W = Welfare  
XZ = a vector including inputs that are considered a net loss for the economy 
Y = Gross Domestic Product 
YNONOIL = Non oil GDP 
YOIL = Oil GDP 
ZHE = Flow of new energy knowledge 
 
7.2.  Assigned Values to Key Parameters: 
 
Parameter: λ (g): 
II I I I I I V V VI VII VIII





USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
I 0.212 0.180 0.003 0.023 0.101 0.415 1.009 0.194 0.027 0.127 0.093 0.389
II 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
III 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
IV 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
V 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
VI 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
VII 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
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